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Abstract
Despite the impressive performance of deep neural net-
works (DNNs) on numerous vision tasks, they still exhibit
yet-to-understand uncouth behaviours. One puzzling be-
haviour is the subtle sensitive reaction of DNNs to various
noise attacks. Such a nuisance has strengthened the line of
research around developing and training noise-robust net-
works. In this work, we propose a new training regularizer
that aims to minimize the probabilistic expected training
loss of a DNN subject to a generic Gaussian input. We pro-
vide an efficient and simple approach to approximate such
a regularizer for arbitrary deep networks. This is done by
leveraging the analytic expression of the output mean of a
shallow neural network; avoiding the need for the memory
and computationally expensive data augmentation. We con-
duct extensive experiments on LeNet and AlexNet on var-
ious datasets including MNIST, CIFAR10, and CIFAR100
demonstrating the effectiveness of our proposed regularizer.
In particular, we show that networks that are trained with
the proposed regularizer benefit from a boost in robustness
equivalent to performing 3-21 folds of data augmentation.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have emerged as generic
models that can be trained to perform impressively well in
both vision related tasks (e.g. object recognition [17] and
semantic segmentation [25]) and non-vision related tasks
(e.g. speech recognition [18] and bio-informatics [2]). De-
spite their increasing popularity, flexibility, generality, and
performance, DNNs have been recently shown to be quite
susceptible to small imperceptible input noise [35, 31, 14].
Such analysis gives a clear indication that even state-of-the-
art DNNs may lack robustness. Consequently, there has
been an ever-growing interest in the computer vision and
machine learning communities to study this uncanny be-
haviour. In particular, the work of [31, 14] demonstrates
that there are systematic approaches to constructing adver-
sarial attacks that result in misclassification errors with high
∗Both authors contributed equally to this work.
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Figure 1: The confidence of a classifier is negatively af-
fected by Gaussian input noise. as we increase the level
of noise σx (i.e., on the left from top to bottom), the confi-
dence of the classifier decreases; see the mean output logits
on the right from top to bottom. However, this is expected
to happen but the rate in which the confidence decays is the
factor that decides the robustness of the classifier. It can be
slowed down through computationally expensive data aug-
mentation or using our proposed lightweight regularizer.
probability. Even more peculiarly, some noise perturbations
seem to be doubly agnostic [30], i.e. there exists a determin-
istic perturbation that can result in misclassification errors
with high probability when applied to different networks ir-
respective of the input image (network and input agnostic).
Understanding this degradation in performance under
adversarial attacks is of tremendous importance, espe-
cially for real-world DNN deployments (e.g., self-driving
cars/drones and equipment for the visually impaired). A
standard and popular mean to alleviate this nuisance is
noisy data augmentation in training, i.e. a DNN is exposed
to noisy input images during training so as to bolster its
robustness during inference. Several works have demon-
strated that DNNs can in fact benefit from such augmenta-
tion [31, 14]. However, data augmentation in general might
not be sufficient for two reasons. (1) Particularly with high-
dimensional input noise, the amount of data augmentation
necessary to sufficiently capture the noise space will be very
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large, which will increase the training time. (2) Data aug-
mentation with high energy noise can negatively impact the
performance on noise-free test examples. This can be ex-
plained by the fundamental trade-off between accuracy and
robustness [37, 4]. It can also arise from the fact that the
augmentation forces the DNN to have the same prediction
for two vastly different versions of the same input: noise-
free and a substantially corrupted version. Therefore, we
propose a new regularizer for noise-robust networks to cir-
cumvent the aforementioned setbacks of data augmentation.
A natural objective to use for training against attacks
sampled from a distribution D, that bypasses the need of
data augmentation, is the expected loss under such distribu-
tion. Since a closed-form expression is generally difficult
to obtain or an approximate surrogate is expensive to eval-
uate (Monte Carlo estimates), we propose instead a closely
related objective that is the loss of the expected predictions
of the network under D-distributed adversarial noise. Since
it has been shown that Gaussian noise can be adversarial
[3] and that such noise is widely studied in image process-
ing applications, we restrict the work in this paper to the
case where D is Gaussian. However, even under such an
assumption, only a notoriously memory and computation-
ally expensive closed-form approximate surrogate for the
expected predictions exist [3] through means of performing
a two-stage linearization to the network. To this end, we
propose a new approach that allows for simple and efficient
evaluation of our proposed regularizer (the expected pre-
diction loss), surpassing formidable network linearizations
and prohibitive data augmentation. Such an approach will
decrease training cost, as it would replace commonly used
and generally effective data augmentation strategies that re-
quires a large number of noisy training examples (especially
as the dimensionality of the problem increases [36]). As a
result, while being faster, we can achieve similar or mostly
better robustness to 3-21 folds of noisy data augmentation.
Contributions. (i) We formalize a new regularizer that
is a function of the probabilistic first moment of the out-
put of a DNN, to train robust DNNs against noise sam-
pled from distribution D. (ii) Under the special choice of
Gaussian attacks, i.e. D is Gaussian, we show how the first
moment expression can be evaluated very efficiently dur-
ing training for an arbitrary deep DNN by bypassing the
need to perform memory and computationally expensive
two-stage linearization. (iii) Extensive experiments on vari-
ous architectures (LeNet [23] and AlexNet [21]) and on sev-
eral datasets (MNIST [22], CIFAR10, and CIFAR100 [20])
demonstrate that a substantial enhancement in robustness
can be achieved when using our regularizer in training. In
fact, in the majority of the experiments, the improvement is
better than training on the same dataset but augmented with
3 to 21 times noisy data. Interestingly, the results suggest
an excellent trade-off between accuracy and robustness.
2. Related Work
Despite the impressive performance of DNNs on various
tasks, they have been proven to be very sensitive to certain
types of noise, commonly referred to as adversarial exam-
ples, particularly in the recognition task [31, 14]. Adver-
sarial examples can be viewed as small imperceptible noise
that once added to the input of a DNN, the performance is
severely degraded. This finding has broadened the interest
in studying and measuring the robustness of DNNs.
The work of [35] suggested a spectral stability analy-
sis for a wide class of DNNs by measuring the Lipschitz
constant of the affine transformation describing a fully-
connected or a convolutional layer. This result was ex-
tended to compute an upper bound for a composition of
layers (i.e., a DNN). However, this measure only sets an
upper bound on the robustness over the entire input domain
and does not take into account the noise distribution. A
later work defined robustness as the mean support of the
minimum adversarial perturbation [9], which is the most
common definition for robustness. It studied robustness
against not only adversarial perturbations but also against
geometric transformations to the input. The authors of [8]
emphasized the independence of the robustness measure to
the ground truth class labels and that it should only de-
pend on the classifier and the dataset distribution. Sub-
sequently, they proposed two different metrics to measure
DNN robustness: one for general adversarial attacks and
the other for noise sampled from a uniform distribution. In
[12], theoretical bounds on the robustness of linear classi-
fiers to Gaussian and uniform noise were derived as a func-
tion of the support of the minimum adversarial perturba-
tion. This work was then extended to DNNs with locally
approximately flat decision boundaries, which is a common
phenomenon in state-of-the-art DNNs. Very recently, the
work of [13] showed the trade-off between robustness and
test error from a theoretical point of view on a simplified
classification problem with hyper-spheres.
On the other hand, and based on various robustness anal-
yses, several works proposed various approaches in build-
ing networks that are robust against noise sampled from
well known distributions and against generic adversarial at-
tacks. For instance, the work of [15] proposed a model that
was trained to classify adversarial examples with statistical
hypothesis testing on the distribution of the dataset. An-
other approach is to perform statistical analysis on the latent
feature space [24, 11] or train a DNN that rejects adversarial
attacks [27]. Moreover, the geometry of the decision bound-
aries of DNN classifiers was studied in [10] to infer a simple
curvature test for this purpose. Using this method, one can
restore the original label and classify the input correctly.
Restoring the original image/label using defense mecha-
nisms, which can only detect adversarial examples, can be
done by denoising the image (ridding it from its adversarial
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nature) so long as the noise perturbation is well-known and
modeled apriori [39]. Motivated by the same goal, the au-
thors of [6, 7] studied the effect of JPEG image compression
on denoising adversarial examples. A more involved solu-
tion would be to build models that are intrinsically more
robust to this type of noise [16]. For example, the use of
bounded ReLU was suggested in [38] to encourage robust-
ness by limiting the output range. They complemented this
model with data augmentation of Gaussian noise, as it has
been shown to be a direct approach in improving robustness.
However, this can be far less effective as the dimensional-
ity of the problem increases. A different work proposed to
distill the learned knowledge from a deep model to retrain
a similar model architecture as means to improving robust-
ness [32]. This training approach is one of many adversarial
training strategies for robustness [28]. More closely to our
work is [5], where a new training regularizer was proposed
for a large family of DNNs. The proposed regularizer softly
enforce that the upper bound of the Lipshitz constant of the
output of the network to be less than or equal to one. More-
over and very recently, the work of [3] has derived analytic
expressions for the output mean and covariance of networks
in the form of (Affine, ReLU, Affine) under a generic Gaus-
sian input. This work also demonstrates how a (memory
and computation expensive) two-stage linearization can be
employed to locally approximate a deep network with a two
layer version; thus, enabling the application of the derived
expressions on the approximate shallow network.
We will first start with an overview of the Gaussian mean
expression from [3]. Next, we propose our new regularizer
that is the loss of the expected network prediction under in-
put noise sampled from general distribution D and how it
relates to data augmentation approaches. Then, we propose
our efficient lightweight approach to evaluate the approx-
imate surrogate of the expected output predictions with-
out neither performing expensive network linearizations nor
data augmentation when D is Gaussian. Lastly, we present
extensive experimental results verifying our contributions.
3. Methodology
3.1. Background on Network Moments
Networks with a single hidden layer of the form (Affine,
ReLU, Affine) can be written in the functional form g(x) =
Bmax (Ax + c1,0p) + c2. The max(.) is an element-wise
operator, A ∈ Rp×n, and B ∈ Rd×p. Thus, g : Rn → Rd.
Given that x ∼ N (µx,Σx), Bibi et al. [3] showed that1:
Theorem 1 The first moment of g(x) is:
E[g(x)] = B
(
µ2  Φ
(
µ2
σ2
)
+ σ2  ϕ
(
µ2
σ2
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ3=T (µ2,σ2)
+c2
(1)
1This is the more compact expression in the author’s project page.
where µ2 = Aµx+c1, σ2 =
√
diag (Σ2), Σ2 = AΣxA>,
Φ and ϕ are the standard Gaussian cumulative (CDF) and
density (PDF) functions, respectively. The multiplication
 and division are element-wise operators. Lastly, diag(.)
extracts the diagonal elements of a matrix into a vector.
To extend the results of Theorem (1) to deeper models, a
two-stage linearization was proposed in [3], where (A, B)
and (c1, c2) are taken to be the Jacobians and biases of the
first order Taylor approximation to both functions around a
certain ReLU layer in a DNN. Please, refer to [3] for more
details about this expression and the proposed linearization.
3.2. Proposed Robust Training Regularizer
Training DNNs that are robust to certain types of noise,
e.g. noise examples from distribution D, is still an elusive
problem. The most standard straightforward approach that
is often used in practice is to sample noise from D and train
the network with the noise-augmented dataset. However,
while this approach is in general effective, it comes with
two major complications. First, if the input space (size of
input data) is large, the amount of noisy examples to be aug-
mented to the dataset might necessarily be large for it to be
effective. Thus, training time will be severely impacted,
and as a consequence, robustness to different noise levels
will be infeasible. Second, if the noise level of the aug-
mented data is very high, the performance of the network
on noise-free examples will also be degraded, since the net-
work is presented during training with two very different
examples, noise-free and a heavily corrupted counterpart,
both of which have the same class label.
To propose an alternative approach to noisy data aug-
mentation that does not suffer from its drawbacks, one has
to realize that this augmentation strategy aims to minimize
the expected training loss of a DNN when subjected to a
noisy input distributionD through sampling. In fact, it min-
imizes an empirical loss that approximates this expected
loss when enough samples are presented during training.
When sampling is insufficient (a drawback of data augmen-
tation in high-dimensions), this approximation is too loose
and robustness can suffer. However, if we have access to
an analytic expression for the expected loss of the network,
expensive data augmentation and sampling can be averted.
This is the key motivation of the paper. Mathematically, the
training loss can be modeled as:
min
θ
N∑
i=1
(
` (Φ(xi; θ), yi) + αEn∼D [` (Φ(xi + n; θ), yi)]
)
(2)
Here, Φ : Rn → Rd is any arbitrary network with
parameters θ, ` is the loss function, {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 are
the noise-free data-label training pairs and α ≥ 0 is
a trade off parameter. While the first term in (2) is
the standard empirical loss commonly used for train-
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Figure 2: Overview of the proposed graph for training Gaussian robust networks using very efficient approximation to
the proposed regularizer in Eq (3). The yellow block corresponds to an arbitrary network Φ(., θ) viewed as the composition
of two subnetworks separated by a ReLU as nonlinearity. The stream on the bottom computes the output mean µ4 of the
network Φ(:, θ) under the assumption that (i) the noise input distribution is independent Gaussian with variances σ2x (ii)
Ω(. : θ2) is approximated by a linear function. Such evaluation for the output mean is efficient as it requires an extra forward
pass as opposed to any form of computationally and memory intensive network linearizations or data augmentation.
ing, the second term is often replaced with its Monte
Carlo estimates through data augmentation. That is, for
each training example xi, the second term in (2) is ap-
proximated with an empirical average of N˜ noisy ex-
amples of xi such that En∼D[` (Φ(xi + n; θ), yi)] ≈
1
N˜
∑N˜
j=1 ` (Φ(xi + nj ; θ), yi). This will increase the size
of the dataset by a factor of N˜ (there are N˜ samples for
each xi), which will in turn increase training complexity.
As discussed earlier, network performance on the noise-free
examples can also be negatively impacted. Note that obtain-
ing a closed form expression for the second term in (2) for
some of the popularly used losses ` is more complicated
than deriving expressions for the output mean of the net-
work Φ itself, e.g. in Theorem (1). Therefore, we propose
to replace this loss (2) with the following surrogate:
min
θ
N∑
i=1
(
` (Φ(xi; θ), yi) + α` (En∼D [Φ(xi + n; θ)] , yi)
)
(3)
Because of Jensen’s inequality, Eq (3) is a lower bound to
Eq (2) when ` is convex, which is the case for most popular
losses including `2-loss and cross-entropy loss. The pro-
posed second term in (3) encourages that the output mean
of the network Φ of every noisy example xi+n matches the
correct class label yi. This regularizer will stimulate a sep-
aration among the output mean of the classes if the training
data is subjected to noise sampled fromD. Having access to
an analytic expression for these means will prompt a simple
inexpensive training, where the actual size of the training
set is unaffected and augmentation is avoided. This form of
regularization is proposed to replace data augmentation.
While a closed-form expression for the second term of
(3) might be infeasible for a general network Φ(.), an ex-
pensive approximation can be attained. In particular, The-
orem (1) provides an analytic expression to evaluating the
second term in (3), for when D is Gaussian and when the
network is approximated by a two-stage linearization pro-
cedure as Φ(x) ≈ Bmax (Ax + c1,0p) + c2. However,
it is not clear how to utilize such a result to regularize net-
works during training with (3) as a loss. This is primarily
due to the computationally expensive and memory intensive
network linearization, i.e. two-stage linearization proposed
in [3], which makes it challenging to expose the network pa-
rameters θ for efficient update in training [1]. Specifically,
the linearization parameters (A,B, c1, c2) are a function of
the network parameters, θ, that are updated with every gra-
dient descent step on (3); thus, two-stage linearization has
to be performed in every θ update step, which is infeasible.
3.3. On an Efficient Approximation to (3)
The loss in (3) proposes a generic approach to train ro-
bust arbitrary networks against noise sampled from an arbi-
trary distributionD. Since the problem in its general setting
is too broad for detailed analysis, we restrict the scope of
this work to the class of networks, which are most popu-
larly used and parameterized by θ, Φ(.; θ) : Rn → Rd with
ReLUs as nonlinear activations. Moreover, since random
Gaussian noise was shown to exhibit an adversarial nature
[3, 34, 12], and that it is one of the most well studied noise
models in computer vision for the nice properties it exhibits,
we restrict D to the case of Gaussian noise. In particular, D
is independent zero-mean Gaussian noise at the input, i.e.
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n ∼ D = N (0,Σx = Diag (σ2x)), where σ2x ∈ Rn is
a vector of variances and Diag(.) reshapes the vector ele-
ments into a diagonal matrix. Generally, it is still difficult
to compute the second term in (3) under Gaussian noise for
arbitrary networks. However, if we have access to an inex-
pensive approximation of the network, avoiding the compu-
tationally and memory expensive network linearization in
[3], Φ in the form Φ(x) ≈ Bmax (Ax + c1,0p) + c2, an
approximation to the second term in (3) can thus be used for
efficient robust training directly on θ.
Consider the lth ReLU layer in Φ(.; θ); the network can
be expressed as Φ(.; θ) = Ω(ReLUl(Υ(., θ1)); θ2). Note
that the parameters of the overall network Φ(.; θ) is the
union of the parameters of the two subnetworks Υ(.; θ1)
and Ω(.; θ2), i.e. θ = θ1 ∪ θ2. Throughout this work and
to simplify the analysis, we set l = 1. That is, under
such choice of l, the first subnetwork Υ(., θ1) is linear with
θ1 = {A, c1}. However, the second subnetwork Ω(., θ2) is
not linear in general, and thus, one can linearize Ω(., θ2) at
En∼N (0,Σx) [ReLU1 (Υ (xi + n; θ1))] = T (µ2, σ2) = µ3.
Note that µ3 is the output mean after the ReLU and µ2 =
Axi + c1, since Υ(xi + n; θ1) = A (xi + n) + c1. Both
T (., .) and σ2 are defined in (1). Thus, linearizing Ω at µ3
with linearization parameters {B, c2}, where B is the Jaco-
bian of Ω and where c2 = Ω(µ3, θ2)−Bµ3, we have that for
any point vi close to µ3 that Ω(vi, θ2) ≈ Bvi + c2. While
computing {B, c2} through linearization is generally very
expensive, computing the approximation to (3) does not re-
quire explicit access to either B nor c2. Note that the second
term in our proposed Eq (3) for l = 1 is given as
`
(
En∼N (0,Σx)[Φ(xi + n; θ)], yi
)
= `
(
Ezi∼N (xi,Σx)[Ω (ReLU1 (Υ(zi; θ1)) ; θ2)], yi
)
= `
(
Ezi∼N (xi,Σx)[Ω (ReLU1 (Azi + c1) ; θ2)], yi
)
≈ ` (Ezi∼N (xi,Σx) [B (ReLU1 (Azi + c1)) + c2] , yi)
= ` (Bµ3 + c2, yi) = ` (Ω(µ3, θ2), yi) . (4)
The approximation follows from the assumption that the
input to the second subnetwork Ω(.; θ2), i.e. vi =
ReLU1 (Azi + c1)), is close to the point of linearization
µ3 such that Ω(vi; θ2) ≈ Bvi + c2. Or simply, that the
input to Ω is close to the mean inputs, i.e. µ3, to Ω under
Gaussian noise. The penultimate equality follows from the
linearity of the expectation. As for the last equality, note
that {B, c2} are the linearization parameters of Ω at µ3,
where c2 = Ω(µ3, θ2) − Bµ3 by the first order Taylor ap-
proximation. Thus, computing the second term of Eq (3) ac-
cording to Eq (4) can be simply approximated by a forward
pass of µ3 through the second network Ω. As for computing
µ3 = T (µ2, σ2), note that µ2 = Axi + c1 in Eq (4), which
is equivalent to a forward pass of xi through the first subnet-
work. This is since Υ(., θ1) is linear, where θ1 = {A, c1}.
Moreover, note that since σ2 =
√
diag (AΣxA>) where
Σx = Diag
(
σ2x
)
, the following identity follows:
σ2 =
√
diag (ADiag (σ2x) A>) =
√
(AA)σ2x. (5)
The latter can be efficiently computed by simply squaring
the linear parameters in the first subnetwork and perform-
ing a forward pass of the input noise variance σ2x through Υ
without the bias c1 and taking the element-wise square root.
Lastly, it is straightforward to compute T (µ2, σ2) as it is
an element-wise function as defined in Eq (1). The overall
computational graph in Figure 2 shows a summary on the
computation of Eq (3) using only forward passes through
the two subnetworks Υ and Ω. It is now possible with the
proposed efficient approximation of our proposed regular-
izer in Eq (3) to efficiently train networks on noisy training
examples that are corrupted with noise N (0,Σx) without
any form of prohibitive data augmentation.
4. Experiments
In this section, we conduct experiments on multiple net-
work architectures and datasets to demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our proposed regularizer in training more robust
networks, especially in comparison with data augmentation.
We first propose a new unified robustness metric against ad-
ditive noise from a general distribution D. We later special-
ize this metric to the case when D is Gaussian. Lastly, we
compare our experimental results to data augmentation.
4.1. On the Robustness Evaluation Metric
While there is a consensus on the definition of robustness
in the presence of adversarial attacks, as the smallest pertur-
bation required to fool a network, change the prediction of
the network on the noise-free example, it is not straightfor-
ward to extend such a definition to additive noise sampled
from a distribution D. In particular, the work of [8] tried to
address this difficulty by defining the robustness of a clas-
sifier around an example x as the distance between x and
the closest decision boundary. However, such a definition
is difficult to compute in practice and is not scalable, as it
requires solving a generally nonconvex optimization prob-
lem for every testing example x that may also suffer from
poor local minima. To remedy these drawbacks, we present
a new robustness metric for generic additive noise.
Robustness Against Additive Noise. Consider a classi-
fier Ψ(.) with ψ(x) = arg maxi Ψi(x) as the predicted
class label for the example x regardless of the correct class
label yi. We define the robustness on a sample x against a
generic additive noise sampled from a distribution D as:
<D(x) = Pn∼D{ψ(x + n) = ψ(x)}. (6)
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Here, the proposed robustness metric <D(x) measures the
probability of the classifier to preserve the original predic-
tion of the noise-free example, i.e. ψ(x), after adding noise,
i.e. ψ(x + n), from distribution D. Therefore, the robust-
ness over a testing dataset T can be defined as the expected
robustness over the test dataset: <D(T ) = Ex∼T [<D(x)].
Inspired by [12], for ease, we relax Definition (6) from the
probability of preserving the prediciton score under D sam-
pled noise to a 0/1 robustness over m-randomly sampled
examples from D. That is we say that <D(x) = 1, if for m
randomly sampled noise from D that are added to x, none
of which changed the prediction from ψ(x). However, if
a single example of the m samples changed the prediction
from ψ(x), we set <D(x) = 0. The final robustness score
is then averaged over the testing dataset T .
Robustness Against Gaussian Noise. For additive Gaus-
sian noise, i.e. D = N (0,Σx = Diag
(
σ2x
)
), robustness is
averaged over a range of testing variances σ2x. We restrict
σx to 30 evenly sampled values in [0, 0.5], where this set is
denoted as A2. In practice, this is equivalent to sampling m
Gaussian examples for each σx ∈ A, and if none of the m
samples changes the prediction of the classifier ψ from the
original noise-free example, the robustness for that sample
at that σx noise level is set to 1 and then averaged over the
complete testing set. Then, the robustness is the average
over multiple σx ∈ A. To make the computation even more
efficient, instead of sampling a large number of Gaussian
noise samples (m), we only sample a single noise sample
with the average energy over D. That is we sample a single
n of norm ‖n‖2 = σx
√
n. This is due to the fact that:
E
x∼N (0n,σ2xI)
[‖x‖2] =
√
2σ2x
Γ
(
n+1
2
)
Γ
(
n
2
) n→∞= σx√n
4.2. Experimental Setup
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed regularizer in improving robustness. Several ex-
periments are performed with our objective (3), where we
strike a comparison with data augmentation approaches.
Hyperparameters. We opt to use PyTorch version 0.4.1
[33] to implement all the experiments3, with the hyper-
parameters fixed as listed in Table 1 and two optimizers:
Adam (betas=(0.9, 0.999), eps=10−8, amsgrad=False) [19],
SGD (momentum=0.9, dampening=0, nesterov=True) [26].
In each experiment, we randomly split the training dataset
into 10% validation and 90% training and monitor the
validation loss after each epoch. If it didn’t improve
for lr patience epochs, we reduce the learning rate by
2We assume that the input x is normalized [0, 1]n
3Source code: github.com/ModarTensai/gaussian-regularizer
Hyper-parameter LeNet AlexNet
optimizer Adam SGD
minibatch size 1000 128
lr initial 0.0001 0.1
lr patience 3 5
lr factor 0.9 0.5
loss patience 10 20
weight decay 0 0.0005
Table 1: Lists the training optimization hyper-parameters.
multiplying it by lr factor and we start with an initial
learning rate of lr initial. The training is terminated only if
the validation loss didn’t improve for loss patience epochs
or if training reached 100 epochs, and report the results on
the model with the best validation loss.
Architecture Details. The input images in MNIST (gray-
scale) and CIFAR (colored) are squares with sides equal
to 28 and 32, respectively. Since AlexNet was origi-
nally trained on ImageNet of sides equal to 224, we will
marginally alter the implementation of AlexNet in TorchVi-
sion [29] to accommodate for this difference. First, we need
the output of the fully-convolutional part of the models to
have a positive shape, which lead to changing the number
of hidden units in the first fully-connected layer (in LeNet
to 4096, AlexNet to 256, LeNet on MNIST to 3136). For
AlexNet, we will changed all pooling kernel sizes from 3
to 2 and the padding size of conv1 from 2 to 5. Second,
we swapped each maxpool with the preceding ReLU which
will make training and inference more efficient. Third, we
needed to enforce that the first layer in all the models is a
convolution followed by ReLU as discussed earlier. Lastly,
for analysis simplicity, we removed all dropout layers.
4.3. Results
For each model and dataset, we compare vanilla trained
models, models trained with noise-free data and without our
regularization, against two groups of experiments; data aug-
mentation and our objective (3). Each group has two config-
urable variables: the level of noise controlled by σ2x during
training, and the amount of noise controlled by the trade-off
coefficient α in Eq (3) or N˜ in the case of augmentation,
where N˜ is the number of added noisy training examples.
Accuracy vs. Robustness. We start by demonstrat-
ing that data augmentation tend to improve the robust-
ness, as captured by <(T ) over the testset, on the ex-
pense of decreasing the testing accuracy on the noise-
free examples. Realizing this is essential for a fair
comparison, as one would need to compare the robust-
ness of networks that only have similar noise-free test-
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(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR10 (c) CIFAR100
Figure 3: General trade-off between accuracy and robustness on LeNet. We see, in all plots, that the accuracy tends to
be negatively correlated with robustness over varying noise levels and amount of augmentation. Baseline refers to training
without data augmentation nor our regularizer. However, it is hard to compare the performance of our method against data
augmentation from these plots as we can only compare the robustness of models with similar noise-free testing accuracy.
(a) MNIST (acc = 99.14%, N˜ = 21) (b) CIFAR10 (acc = 69.85%, N˜ = 2) (c) CIFAR100 (acc = 38.16%, N˜ = 21)
Figure 4: Fair robustness comparison of LeNet with data augmentation and our regularizer. The results reported are
only for models with a testing accuracy that is at least as good as the accuracy of the baseline model with a tolerance; 0%,
0.39%, and 0.75% for MNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100, respectively. Thereafter, only the models with the highest robustness
are presented. It is clear that training with our regularizer, while maintaining a high noise-free testing accuracy, can attain
similar/better robustness than performing 21 times noisy data augmentation on MNIST and CIFAR100.
ing accuracies. To show this, we ran 60 training experi-
ments with data augmentation on LeNet with three datasets
(MNIST, CIFAR10, and CIFAR100), four augmentation
levels (N˜ ∈ {2, 6, 11, 21}), and five noise levels (σx ∈ A =
{0.125, 0.25, 0.325, 0.5, 1.0}). In contrast, we ran robust
training experiments using our objective (3) with the trade-
off coefficient α ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 5, 10, 20} on the same
datasets, but we extended the noise levels σx to include the
extreme noise regime of σx ∈ {2, 5, 10, 20}. These noise
levels are too large to be used for data augmentation, espe-
cially since x ∈ [0, 1]n; however as we will see, they are
still beneficial for our proposed regularizer. Figure 3 shows
both the testing accuracy and robustness as measured by
<(T ) over a varying range of training σx for the data aug-
mentation approach (with varying augmentation levels) of
LeNet on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. It is impor-
tant to note here that the main goal of these plots is not
to compare the robustness achieved by our method versus
data augmentation, rather, they demonstrate a very impor-
tant trend. In particular, increasing the training σx for ei-
ther approach degrades testing accuracy on noise-free data.
However, the degradation in our approach is much more
graceful since the trained LeNet model was never directly
exposed to individually corrupted examples during train-
ing as opposed to the data augmentation approach. Note
that our proposed regularizer (3) enforces the separation be-
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(a) CIFAR 10 (acc = 68.91%, N˜ = 11) (b) CIFAR 100 (acc = 38.10%, N˜ = 6)
Figure 5: Fair robustness comparison of AlexNet with data augmentation and our regularizer. The reported models
trained with our regularizer on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 on all training σx are within 1.68% and 4.83% accuracy of the
baseline accuracy, respectively. Note that the models trained with the proposed regularizer can achieve better robustness than
11-fold and 6-fold noisy data augmentation on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, respectively.
tween the expected output prediction analytically. More-
over, the robustness of both methods consistently improves
as the training σx increases. This trend holds even on the
easiest dataset (MNIST). Interestingly, models trained with
our regularizer enjoys an improvement int testing accuracy
over the baseline vanilla trained model. Such a behaviour is
only exhibited with large factor of augmentation, N˜ = 21,
with a small enough training σx on MNIST. This indicates
that models can benefit from better accuracy with a good
approximation of (2) through our proposed objective (3) or
through extensive Monte Carlo estimation. However, as
σx increase, Monte Carlo estimates of the second term in
(2) through data augmentation, with N˜ = 21, is no longer
enough to capture the noise. In the next section, we prop-
erly compare the robustness among networks that have a
similarly high testing accuracy for a fair comparison.
Robustness Comparison. Following the previous discus-
sion, it is essential to only compare the robustness of net-
works that achieve similar testing accuracy as it would be
unfair otherwise. This is since one can achieve a perfect
robustness with a deterministic classifier that assigns the
same class label to all possible inputs. This is mainly due
to the proposed robustness metric, as most common robust-
ness metrics, being disassociated from the ground-truth la-
bels where only the predictions of the model are considered.
Therefore, we filtered out the results from Figure 3 by re-
moving all the experiments that achieved lower accuracy
than the baseline model with some tolerance while compar-
ing against the best robustness achieved through data aug-
mentation in that range of accuracy and the baseline. Figure
4 summarizes the results for LeNet. Now, we can clearly
see the difference between training with data augmentation
and our approach. For MNIST (Figure 4a), we achieved
the same robustness as 21-fold data augmentation without
feeding the network with any noisy examples during train-
ing and while preserving the same baseline accuracy. Better
yet, for CIFAR10 (Figure 4b), our method is twice as ro-
bust as the best robustness achieved via data augmentation.
Moreover, for CIFAR100 (Figure 4c), we are able to out-
perform data augmentation by around 5%. Finally, for extra
validation, we also executed the same experiments with a
different model (AlexNet) on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. In
Figure 5, we present the same results with similar observa-
tions and conclusions. We can see that our proposed reg-
ularizer can improve robustness by 15% on CIFAR10 and
around 25% on CIFAR100. It is interesting to note that for
CIFAR10, data augmentation could not improve the robust-
ness of the trained models without drastically degrading the
testing accuracy on the noise-free examples. Moreover, it
is interesting to observe that the best robustness achieved
through data augmentation is even worse than the baseline.
This could be due to the trade-off coefficient α in (2).
5. Conclusion
Addressing the sensitivity problem of deep neural net-
works to adversarial perturbation is of great importance to
the vision community. However, building robust classifiers
against these noises is computationally expensive as it is
generally done through the means of data augmentation. We
proposed a generic lightweight analytic regularizer, which
can be applied to any deep neural network with a ReLU
activation after the first affine layer, that is designed to in-
crease the robustness of the trained models under additive
Gaussian noise. We demonstrated this with multiple archi-
tectures and datasets and showed that it outperforms data
augmentation without observing any noisy examples.
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